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ABSTRACT
What is the impact of internationalization (firms raising capital and trading in international markets)
on the liquidity of the remaining firms in domestic markets? To address this question, we assemble
a panel database of nearly 2,900 firms from 45 emerging economies over the period 1989-2000,
constructed from annual and daily data. First, we find evidence of migration. The domestic trading
of firms that cross-list or issue depositary receipts in foreign public exchanges tends to decrease,
while a significant proportion of their trading activity concentrates in international markets. Second,
this migration is negatively related to the liquidity of the remaining firms in their home market
through  two  separate  channels.  There  are  liquidity  spillovers  within  markets,  with aggregate
domestic trading activity being positively associated with the liquidity of individual firms in the
same market. Moreover, the proportion of trading abroad is negatively related to the liquidity of










sschmukler@worldbank.org 1  
1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the impact of firms from emerging economies that internationalize by 
issuing depositary receipts, cross-listing, or raising capital in international equity markets on the 
liquidity of the remaining firms in the domestic stock market. Although an extensive literature finds 
that internationalization helps these “international firms,” researchers are only beginning to assess the 
ramifications of internationalization on “domestic firms,” those firms that do not internationalize.
1 
Similarly, although emerging market policymakers increasingly express concerns that 
internationalization is hurting their domestic markets, surprisingly little research examines the impact 
of internationalization on domestic firms.
2 To evaluate the cross-firm distributional effects of 
internationalization, we first examine the relation between internationalization and the trading of 
international firms by documenting what happens to a firm’s trading activity and location of this 
trading after it internationalizes. We then study whether the trading activity of international firms is 
associated with the liquidity of domestic firms. Specifically, we examine whether there are market 
externalities: Is aggregate trading activity related to the liquidity of individual firms trading in the 
same market? We also test whether the location of trading activity of international firms affects the 
liquidity of domestic firms.  
The literature provides conflicting predictions about the relation between internationalization 
and the liquidity of domestic firms. Consider first the two-part “migration and spillover” mechanism. 
“Migration” means that internationalization induces a shift in the trading of international firms out of 
                                                 
1 Some examine the volume and liquidity of international firms in domestic markets, e.g., see Hargis (1998), Noronha et 
al. (1996), and Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999). Others study the impact of internationalization on stock prices, e.g., see 
Alexander et al. (1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), and Miller (1999). Still others analyze asset size, growth, financing 
constraints, and the capital structure of firms, e.g., see Pagano et al. (2002), and Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006). See 
Karolyi (2006) for a review. 
2 For concerns that local markets are becoming illiquid due to internationalization, see Bovespa, (1996), Federation des 
Bourses de Valeurs (2000), Financial Times (1998), Latin Finance (1999, 2004); and The Economist (2000). To 
overcome the illiquidity of domestic markets policymakers are trying to come up with new solutions, like the creation of 
Novo Mercado in Brazil or the establishment of regional stock exchanges. See World Bank (2004).   2  
the domestic market and into international financial centers. This may occur because international 
markets have lower information and transaction costs (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991; Lang et al., 
2003), lower settlement risk (Velli, 1994), or more efficient risk pricing (Patro, 2000). “Spillover” 
means that the aggregate trading in a market is related to the liquidity of individual equities. Using 
data from the U.S., Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Coughernour and Saad 
(2004) find that liquidity is not simply an asset specific attribute; rather, an individual asset’s 
liquidity co-moves with market liquidity. Beyond the possibility that common factors influence the 
liquidity of all firms in a market, there might be spillovers, whereby aggregate market activity 
influences the liquidity of individual firms. Spillovers could occur because of fixed costs associated 
with operating a market, like running brokerage firms and clearing and settling transactions. With 
spillovers, therefore, the migration of trading of international firms could increase the per-trade cost 
of domestic stock transactions and reduce the liquidity of domestic firms. Combined, migration and 
spillovers imply that cross-listing or issuing depositary receipts in public international stock markets 
hurts the liquidity of domestic firms. 
The internationalization process might affect domestic markets beyond the migration-
spillover channel. If it is more desirable to trade securities in major international financial centers and 
if investors are concerned about country-specific risk, then as some firms from a country 
internationalize, investors will shift their trading of that country’s risk (as embodied in both 
international and domestic firms) out of domestic firms and into international firms in the 
international market. Indeed, there is evidence that U.S. investors prefer ADR over non-ADR stocks.
3 
The resultant shift in investor interest from domestic to international firms could hurt the liquidity of 
domestic firms beyond the effect through the reduction in domestic trading of international firms. At 
the firm level, internationalization might signal firm quality, which provides an additional mechanism 
                                                 
3 See, Aggarwal et al. (2005), Bradshaw et al. (2004), and Edison and Warnock (2004).  3  
linking internationalization with a drop in domestic firm liquidity (Stulz, 1999). For example, 
internationalization might allow corporations to alleviate agency and informational asymmetry 
problems by “bonding” themselves into markets with greater disclosure requirements and stronger 
shareholder protection systems (Doidge et al., 2004; Gozzi et al., 2005; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; 
Siegel, 2005). Or, internationalization might reduce firms’ cost of capital, by allowing them to 
overcome barriers between markets. From this perspective, internationalization provides a signal 
about firm quality, as the market is better able to distinguish “good” from “bad” firms (those that do 
not internationalize).
4 By signaling firm quality, therefore, internationalization could hurt domestic 
firm liquidity. 
Other papers, however, question the negative effects of internationalization on domestic 
liquidity. Hargis (2000) argues that cross-listings can transform a segmented equity market with low 
liquidity into an integrated market with high trading activity and liquidity. Alexander et al. (1987) 
and Domowitz et al. (1998) hold that internationalization stimulates domestic trading of international 
firms by increasing market integration. Moreover, Halling et al. (2005) argue that foreign trading of 
European firms declines after an initial increase, with liquidity returning to the domestic market (the 
“flow-back” effect). Also, if internationalization improves transparency, this could increase the 
domestic trading of international firms with positive spillover effects for the rest of the domestic 
market (Hargis and Ramanlal, 1998). It is also legitimate to question whether the finding of spillovers 
in the U.S. market generalizes to emerging stock exchanges and whether investors indeed prefer 
international to domestic firms. Thus, the linkages between internationalization and domestic market 
liquidity remain open empirical questions.  
                                                 
4 Cantale (1996) and Fuerst (1998) present models with information asymmetry and establish a signaling equilibrium in 
which firms with better prospects are able to distinguish themselves from firms with lower future profitability by cross-
listing in markets with stricter regulatory environments.  4  
To study the effects of internationalization, we assemble liquidity and trading indicators on 
nearly 2,900 firms from across 45 emerging market countries, covering the period 1989-2000. To 
measure trading activity, we use yearly turnover, which equals the value of a firm’s transactions in a 
market divided by the firm’s market capitalization. Turnover, and similar trade-based indicators, are 
frequently used to proxy for liquidity since (i) many countries do not have bid-ask spread information 
(especially time series data),
5 (ii) it is difficult to collect the daily data for such a large panel of firms 
and countries, and (iii) past research identifies a strong link between turnover and firm performance, 
industrial expansion, and national growth.
6 Nevertheless, since turnover does not directly measure 
trading costs or the price impact of transactions, we interpret turnover less as a precise measure of 
liquidity and more a as a general index of trading activity.  
We also compute two indicators of liquidity, which are constructed from daily data. First, 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity index, which equals the ratio of a stock’s absolute returns to its value 
traded. Hasbrouck (2005) finds that, within the class of price-impact liquidity estimates, Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity index is the most reliable proxy of trading costs. Second, we compute the 
proportion of days in a year when there are no changes in the price of a security. Since researchers 
have used liquidity measures based on this zero return index in recent studies (Lesmond, 2005; 
Lesmond et al., 1999), we use it to assess further the relation between internationalization and the 
liquidity of domestic firms. 
                                                 
5 Also, some research argues that turnover can be a better proxy for liquidity than bid-ask spreads due to problems with 
measuring spreads. From a theoretical perspective, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Stoll (1978a) suggest a direct link 
between trading costs and trading volume and holding periods, respectively. Empirically, Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Stoll 
(1978b) confirm these predictions. Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) demonstrate the problems with computing accurate 
bid-ask spreads. Consequently, a large number papers use turnover and volume-based proxies of liquidity (e.g., Brennan 
et al., 1998; Datar et al., 1998; Haugen and Baker, 1996; Rouwenhorst, 1999). 
6 In terms of theory, Levine (1991) models the link between trading activity and both firm and national growth. 
Empirically, Beck and Levine (2002, 2004), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), and Levine and Zervos (1998a) 
demonstrate the importance of turnover for explaining firm performance, industrial expansion, and economic growth.   5  
The results are broadly consistent with migration. When a firm cross-lists or issues depositary 
receipts in a public international exchange (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange, the London Stock 
Exchange, or NASDAQ), the domestic trading of its shares does not rise; rather, trading tends to 
migrate out of the domestic market and into the international market. However, firms that raise 
capital abroad without providing an easy vehicle for having their shares traded internationally, tend to 
experience an increase, not a decrease, in domestic trading activity.
7 Furthermore, an important 
fraction of the total trading activity of firms that internationalize into a major public exchanges shifts 
abroad. On average, the percentage of trading in the domestic market falls to less that 60 percent after 
internationalization, with no significant flow-back effect in our sample.  
The results are also consistent with spillovers: An individual stock’s liquidity is closely 
related to aggregate trading activity in its market. The aggregate domestic turnover of international 
firms is positively associated with the turnover of domestic firms and negatively associated with both 
the Amihud and zero-return illiquidity indexes for domestic firms. Importantly, the positive relation 
between the liquidity of an individual domestic firm’s stock and the aggregate trading of international 
firms in the domestic market holds when controlling for many time-varying country traits, country 
dummy variables, firm-specific characteristics, and the trading activity of that country’s firms in 
international markets. Overall, the results are consistent with the migration and spillover view. 
Consistent with migration, cross-listing and issuing depositary receipts are associated with a drop in 
the turnover of international firms in their domestic markets and a shift of their trading abroad. 
                                                 
7 For instance, firms that raise money through private placements in the U.S. by means of Rule 144A can only trade 
among qualified institutional buyers on the PORTAL system. Firms that issue Level I ADRs trade on the over-the-counter 
market (OTC), which is not an organized market or exchange, but rather a network of securities dealers. These markets 
tend to provide less liquidity than public exchanges and therefore are less likely to generate migration of trading abroad. 
Therefore, we analyze these types of listings separately from cross-listings and capital raisings in major public exchanges 
and confirm that they have different effects on the domestic trading of international firms.  6  
Consistent with spillovers, the drop in the turnover of international firms in the domestic market is 
associated with a drop in the liquidity of domestic firms.  
Another important finding of the paper is that internationalization is negatively associated 
with the liquidity of domestic firms beyond the migration-spillover channel. The fraction of total 
trading of a country’s stocks (domestic and international) occurring in international markets is 
strongly, negatively related to the liquidity of domestic firms. Thus, not only is there a close 
connection between the aggregate domestic trading of international firms and a domestic firm’s 
liquidity, but the share of trading occurring in international markets is independently and negatively 
linked to the liquidity of domestic firms.  
Our research has both political economy and market microstructure implications. First, we 
find that international financial integration can have distributional implications. Firms that 
internationalize win: Internationalization boosts the total trading of international firms and they grow 
after internationalizing (Gozzi et al., 2005; Levine and Schmukler, 2003). But, domestic firms lose. 
The liquidity of their shares falls as other firms internationalize their trading activity. Thus, different 
firms are likely to have very different views about public policies related to internationalization. For 
instance, if there are high fixed costs to internationalizing and a country lowers legal barrier to 
internationalization, then its largest firms will tend to benefit relative to smaller firms for which the 
fixed costs represent a comparatively large barrier. Second, we find evidence of spillovers in stock 
markets around the world. This has potentially important implications for markets in an era of 
globalization. The prevalence of spillovers represents a powerful force encouraging liquidity to 
concentrate in a few major financial centers, domestically or abroad.  
This paper’s assessment of the impact of internationalization on the turnover and liquidity of 
domestic firms is related to a large literature on internationalization. First, research analyzes the  7  
impact of market integration on economic growth and investment (Bekaert et al., 2005; Henry, 2000; 
Levine and Zervos, 1998a,b). In this paper, we do not focus on financial integration broadly defined. 
Rather, we examine the impact of the decision of one set of firms to internationalize on the liquidity 
of those firms that do not internationalize. Second, as noted above, an extensive literature studies the 
effects of internationalization on international firms. Although we contribute to this work by 
assessing the connection between internationalization and the trading activity of international firms 
using our new database, the focus of our research is different. We concentrate on examining the link 
between internationalization and domestic firms. 
Our work builds on two aggregate assessments of financial integration. Moel (2001) and 
Karolyi (2004) find a negative association between the fraction of a country’s stocks that issue 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and domestic market turnover. Our research makes several 
contributions. First, we use firm-level data, follow firms through time, and examine what happens to 
firms when they internationalize. Second, by using daily data for each firm, we compute commonly 
used proxies of liquidity and assess what happens to the liquidity of individual domestic firms as 
other firms internationalize. Third, we disentangle some of the channels through which 
internationalization can influence domestic stocks. Fourth, we substantially expand the country 
coverage. Our data cover 45 countries, while Karolyi (2004) and Moel (2001) study 12 countries and 
28 countries respectively. Fifth, besides examining firms that internationalize by issuing depositary 
receipts in New York, we also examine (i) firms that issue depositary receipts in other countries and 
(ii) firms that cross-list and/or raise capital in New York and other financial centers. Sixth, we collect 
and incorporate time-varying data on the international trading activities of international firms. This 
allows us to identify more confidently the independent link between internationalization and 
domestic firm liquidity.   8  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 discusses 
the econometric methodology and presents the results. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
To assess the connection between internationalization and the liquidity of domestic stocks, we 
construct a novel dataset using (i) firm-level data on trading and liquidity in the domestic market, (ii) 
data on the international activity of firms, including stock trading in international markets and dates 
of cross-listings, depositary receipts issuances, and capital raisings in international equity markets, 
(iii) firm-level data on firm attributes, and (iv) country-level data on turnover, macroeconomic, 
institutional, and financial conditions. Since the data come from various sources, we match the firm-
level variables on domestic stock market trading and liquidity, the firm-level balance sheet 
information, the data on the international equity market activities of each firm, and country-level 
characteristics.  
As a measure of trading activity, which is also frequently used by researchers as a proxy for 
liquidity, we employ turnover, which equals a firm’s value traded divided by its market 
capitalization. The data come from the Standard & Poor’s Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB), 
formerly collected by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank. In cross-
checking with country sources, the EMDB is very accurate. For Argentina, however, we discovered 
that the EMDB is inconsistent over time. Thus, unlike previous studies, we circumvent this problem 
by collecting the data directly from the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange. The EMDB provides data on 
domestic market capitalization and domestic value traded in current U.S. dollars by firm. Although 
the EMBD is one of the most comprehensive databases on firm-level trading of equities around the 
world, the EMDB focuses on emerging markets and does not include 100 percent of local firms (i.e.,  9  
while varying by country, the EMDB typically covers about 70 percent of market capitalization). We 
have sufficient data to compute turnover for 2,875 firms.  
We use daily data from Datastream to construct firm-level measures of annual liquidity for a 
broad cross-section of more than 1,000 firms, across 31 countries, over 12 years, totaling almost 
1,600,000 firm-day observations. To measure firm-level liquidity, we construct Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity index and the share of zero-return days. Section 3 defines these two illiquidity variables. 
After constructing these measures at a daily frequency, we aggregate and calculate the liquidity 
measures on a yearly basis to match the other data. We require that firms have a minimum of 50 daily 
observations within a year to compute the illiquidity measures. For the Amihud illiquidity ratio, we 
eliminate daily observations with absolute returns over 50 percent (following Lesmond, 2005) and 
remove the top and bottom one percent of the daily observations before computing the yearly 
measure to control for outliers. In calculating these illiquidity measures, we only use firms with data 
on turnover from the EMDB to keep results comparable across tables. Since data on returns is more 
easily available than data on trading activity, the number of daily observations used to compute the 
zero return measure is significantly higher than that used to calculate Amihud’s illiquidity index, 
which requires information on value traded. We use nearly 1,600,000 daily observations to compute 
the zero return measure and over 1,050,000 daily observations to calculate Amihud’s illiquidity 
index. Despite these differences, we were able to compute both annual liquidity measures for similar 
samples in terms of firm and time-series coverage.  
Regarding the international equity market activities of firms, we collect more data than past 
studies to provide a more accurate categorization of the internationalization process. While most 
papers focus only on the ADR market and ignore internationalization in equity markets beyond the  10 
U.S., we consider a much broader array of international equity markets. The data for identifying and 
dating each firm’s international activities come from different sources. 
We start with data from the Bank of New York. Besides the bank’s standard database (the 
Complete Depositary Receipt Directory) that contains information on current depositary receipt 
activities, the Bank of New York gave us access to their historical databases and reports on (i) 
depositary receipt program initiation dates, (ii) termination dates (if any), (iii) capital raisings, and 
(iv) trading activity. We complement these data with information from JP Morgan and Citigroup on 
ADR program initiation dates. The use of these additional sources helps us to cross-check the data, 
obtain missing information, and correct reporting errors. These data form a comprehensive database 
on ADR and Global Depositary Receipt (GDR) programs. The historical data start in January 1956, 
but the vast majority of programs begins after 1980.  
We augment this information on dating the initiation of international equity market activities 
with data from Euromoney, the London Stock Exchange (LSE), NASDAQ, and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). Euromoney provides the dates when firms raise equity capital in international 
markets, including cross-listings and issuance of global depositary receipts, which substantively 
enhances the accurate categorization of firms as international or domestic. The Euromoney database 
covers 8,795 cross-border equity issuance and cross-listing operations from 5,665 firms in 86 
countries over the period January 1983 - April 2001. LSE, NASDAQ, and NYSE provide information 
on listing dates by foreign corporations.  
Consistent with our objective of assembling a broad database on internationalization, we 
classify firms as international if they ever (i) issue depositary receipts, (ii) cross-list, or (iii) raise 
equity capital through private or public placements abroad. In the time-series dimension, a firm 
becomes international from the first time it issues a depositary receipt, cross-lists, or raises capital  11 
abroad. If it then de-lists, it is considered domestic again. Cross-listings, depositary receipts, and 
capital raisings on major public exchanges clearly involve ongoing trading of local firms in foreign 
countries. However, private capital raisings or cross-listings on over-the-counter (OTC) markets are 
different because they do not provide firms with an easy vehicle for having their shares traded 
abroad. Thus, while the issuance of depositary receipts and cross-listing on public exchanges may 
involve the two effects discussed in the Introduction (migration and spillovers), cross-listings on 
OTC markets and private capital raisings are less likely to generate migration. Therefore, we analyze 
these types of listings separately from cross-listings and capital raisings in public exchanges and 
confirm that they have a different relation with the domestic trading of international firms. 
We use balance sheet information on each firm to control for firm-specific characteristics that 
may influence liquidity. For simplicity, in the results discussed below, we present the regressions 
controlling for firm size only, but the results are robust to controlling for other firm traits, e.g., sales 
growth and industry dummy variables. We obtain these data from the Worldscope database 
(Thomson Financial Company). 
Regarding the country-level trading variables, we compute the aggregate domestic turnover of 
international and domestic firms from firm-level turnover data. Additionally, we compute the share of 
total trading taking place abroad. To measure total domestic trading, we use aggregate country-level 
data on value traded domestically from the EMDB. To calculate trading abroad, we use data on ADR 
trading. The dataset comes from the Bank of New York, providing the value traded in U.S. dollars at 
the firm level. We then aggregate these data to obtain country-level measures. Data from the LSE and 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) on the trading of depositary receipts and cross-listed firms are 
not available for our entire time span and, thus, are not included in our dataset. This underestimates  12 
the amount of trading abroad, but it is unlikely to systematically bias the results in any particular 
direction.  
We include an assortment of country-level control variables. In particular, we use gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita as a measure of countries’ overall economic development. We 
also control for a country’s stock market development by including the aggregate market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP. We also estimated all the regressions including the law and 
order index as an independent variable to control for each country’s legal and institutional 
environment. The law and order index rarely enters significantly because it is highly correlated with 
GDP per capita. Moreover, its inclusion does not affect any of the results reported below. Finally, 
since we analyze the impact of firms’ decisions to internationalize, it is important to control for the 
stock market openness. Therefore, we include two alternative measures of stock market liberalization. 
The first one is a dummy variable which equals one after a country liberalizes its stock market, and 
zero otherwise. The data for dating the liberalization of stock markets come two sources: Bekaert et 
al. (2005), who present official liberalization dates, and Vinhas de Souza (2005), who constructs an 
index of the extent of stock market liberalization for Eastern European countries. We combine these 
two sources to get the widest possible coverage. The second stock market liberalization variable 
comes from Edison and Warnock (2003) and measures the degree of market integration by estimating 
the availability of a country’s equities to foreigners. Note that the two liberalization variables differ in 
terms of country coverage. The Edison and Warnock measure covers 29 countries, while we have 
data to compute the stock market liberalization dummy for 39 of the countries included in our 
sample. As a robustness test, we estimated all the regressions including only firms from those 
countries that have data on both liberalization variables (27 countries) and obtained similar results.  13 
The final dataset covers the period 1989 to 2000, with over 9,000 firm-year observations, 
from 45 emerging economies (as classified by the EMDB). To control for the effects of possible 
outliers and data entry errors, we eliminate year observations when the dependent variable in a 
regression is more than three standard deviations away from the country mean. Appendix Table I lists 
the countries included in the study and the number of domestic and international firms per country 
used for the dependent variables and to compute the aggregate turnover measures.
8 Appendix Table I 
also has summary statistics of the liquidity and trading variables. Appendix Table II provides 
additional information on the data sources. 
 
3. Methodology and Results 
This section examines the mechanisms through which firms that access international equity 
markets may affect the liquidity of firms that do not internationalize. The first part of this analysis 
involves testing for migration. Does the trading of a firm’s stock migrate from the domestic to the 
international market after it internationalizes? Second, we test for how this migration might affect the 
liquidity of domestic firms. In particular, are the aggregate domestic trading activity of international 
firms and the share of trading abroad associated with the liquidity of individual stocks traded in the 
local market?  
3.1. MIGRATION 
3.1.1. Migration: Cross-listing and Issuing Depositary Receipts in Public Exchanges 
We first examine what happens to the trading of a firm in the domestic market after it cross-
lists, issues a depositary receipt, or raises capital in an international public exchange. That is, we 
                                                 
8 The difference in the number of firms used in the regressions and those used to calculate the aggregate measures is 
explained by the availability of data on the firm-level characteristics included in the regressions. Also, note that in the 
regressions of domestic firms we control for the average domestic turnover of firms that cross-listed or raised capital in 
major international exchanges, therefore only these international firms are used to compute the aggregate measures.  14 
examine only firms that create a mechanism to have their shares easily traded in a major international 
financial market. In this way, we restrict the sample to firms for which substantial migration is 
feasible. We estimate the following specification, 
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I
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The regressions include country and year effects ( t c n τ  and    respectively), though these are not 
reported in the tables. The regressions are estimated using Newey-West standard errors, reported in 
brackets. These standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. For 
robustness, the last column in each table also reports results estimated using standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. 
I
t c j T , ,  is the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio of international firm j from country c in 
year t, where the turnover ratio equals the total value traded of firm j’s stock during year t divided by 
firm j’s market capitalization.
9 The superscript I designates that it is an international firm, which is a 
firm that issues a depositary receipt, cross-lists, or raises capital abroad at some point in the sample. 
As noted, we further restrict the sample in Table I to firms that cross-list or issue depositary receipts 
in public exchanges.  
t c j A , ,  equals the logarithm of the total assets (in U.S. dollars) of firm j from country c in year 
t. Since research suggests that large, liquid firms tend to internationalize and since we want to capture 
the independent relation between internationalization and local activity, we control for firm size. 
t c j ID , ,  is a dummy variable that equals zero if firm j from country c during year t has not yet 
internationalized. It equals one in the year the firm internationalizes and remains one thereafter unless 
                                                 
9 We use this transformation because the total value traded is sometimes zero. Out of a total of more than 13,200 firm-
year observations with data on turnover in our dataset, there are only 273 observation with total value traded equal to 
zero. We estimated all the regressions excluding those observations and obtained results similar to those reported below. 
We also estimated the regressions using the log of turnover and obtained similar results.   15 
the firm de-lists or ends its depositary receipt program. In defining the internationalization dummy, 
we use the firm’s first internationalization activity. Thus, if a firm first issues a private placement 
abroad and later cross-lists in an international public exchange, this firm is not included in the Table I 
regressions. If the estimated coefficient on  t c j ID , ,  is negative (i.e., if α <0), then this indicates that 
when a firm internationalizes its turnover in the local market tends to fall. 
D
t c T ,  is the logarithm of one plus the average turnover of domestic firms in country c during 
year t. Since we are testing whether the domestic trading activity of international firms changes when 
a firm internationalizes, we include the trading activity of other firms in the domestic market to 
control for the myriad of factors shaping aggregate domestic trading activity. This helps identify the 
connection between a firm’s decision to internationalize and its domestic trading activity. 
Furthermore, including the average turnover of domestic firms provides information on the relation 
between the domestic activity of an individual firm,
I
t c j T , , , and aggregate market activity. In particular, 
a positive coefficient on the average turnover of domestic firms indicates that an individual firm’s 
domestic trading activity is positively associated with aggregate trading in the market. 
I
t c ST ,  equals the logarithm of one plus the value traded abroad of country c’s international 
firms in year t divided by the total value traded in all markets of country c’s international and 
domestic firms in year t. Including this variable provides an estimate of the relation between the 
degree to which a country’s firms are traded abroad and the domestic trading of a firm’s shares. This 
also provides greater power in assessing the independent relation between a firm’s decision to 
internationalize and the trading of its shares on the local market.  
t c C ,  is a set of time-varying country characteristics. We include two alternative measures of 
the openness of each country’s stock exchanges. The stock market liberalization dummy equals zero  16 
before a country liberalizes and one after a country formally allows foreign investors to invest in 
domestic equities. The Edison and Warnock (2003) liberalization measure is the ratio of the market 
capitalization of the S&P/IFC Investable Index over the total market capitalization of each country.
10 
This index provides a quantitative measure of the availability of the country’s equities to foreigners. 
We include these indicators in the analyses to control for the possibility that national policies toward 
stock market liberalization will affect both domestic trading activity and internationalization decision. 
We also control for the country’s level of economic and financial development as measured by GDP 
per capita and domestic stock market capitalization divided by the country’s GDP. Thus, we want to 
evaluate the relation between a firm’s decision to internationalize and its domestic trading activity 
while holding constant country and financial development. 
The regressions reported in Table I and throughout the paper use unbalanced panels. Since the 
sample of firms for which we have complete sets of dependent and independent variables varies 
considerably over time, using a balanced sample reduces the overall number of observations 
significantly. Also, note that within each table the sample of firms varies across specifications, due to 
differences in the coverage of the country-level variables used in the regressions. We also estimated 
all the regressions holding the sample size constant across specifications and found similar results. 
Table I provides evidence broadly consistent with migration. More specifically, firms that 
cross-list or issue depositary receipts tend to experience a drop in domestic trading activity. Across 
the different specifications, the internationalization dummy ( ) t c j ID , ,  enters with a negative 
coefficient. It enters significantly at the five percent level when using Newey-West standard errors 
that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at the firm level (regressions 1 – 5) and at the 
                                                 
10 Edison and Warnock (2003) calculate a smoothed measure that takes into account asymmetric shocks to investable and 
non-investable stocks, which would lead to changes in the ratio of market capitalization. They convert this variable into a 
capital control measure by taking one less the adjusted ratio. To be consistent with the stock market liberalization dummy, 
we converted their capital control measure into a liberalization index by subtracting one from it.  17 
ten percent level when using standard errors clustered at the firm level (regression 6). Critically, we 
find that a firm’s domestic trading activity falls after it cross-lists or issues a depositary receipt in an 
international public exchange even when controlling for aggregate trading activity in the domestic 
market, liberalization of the domestic market, firm size, a number of country characteristics, as well 
as country and year dummy variables. The size of the coefficient in regression 5 of Table I indicates 
that the average firm experiences a fall of its domestic turnover of about 17 percent after cross-listing 
or issuing a depositary receipt in an international public exchange. To compute this, note that the 
dependent variable in these regressions is the logarithm of one plus the domestic turnover of 
international firms. Since the coefficient on the internationalization dummy is -0.06, the estimated 
relation indicates that internationalization is associated with a six percent drop in one plus the 
domestic turnover of international firms. Given that the average domestic turnover for the sample of 
international firms included in regression 5 is 0.55, this implies that internationalization into a public 
stock exchange is associated with a drop of 0.093 or 17 percent in the domestic turnover of the 
average firm.  
Furthermore, Table I indicates a strong positive association between the average level of 
trading activity by domestic firms in the market and the domestic turnover of the firm that 
internationalizes. Average turnover of domestic firms enters positively and significantly in all of the 
regressions. This shows that the domestic trading activity of an individual firm is positively linked to 
aggregate trading in the market even after controlling for country and year effects, many time-varying 
country effects, as well as the size of the firm. The effect is also economically relevant. The size of 
the coefficient in regression 5 of Table I indicates that an individual international firm’s domestic 
turnover tends to rise by more than five percent when there is an increase in the average turnover of 
domestic firms of 10 percent. To see this, note that the coefficient in regression 5 in Table I indicates  18 
that a rise in one plus the average turnover of domestic firms of five percent is associated with an 
increase in one plus the domestic turnover of international firms of 2.2 percent. Given that the 
average turnover of domestic firms in these regressions is 0.9, this means that an 11 percent increase 
in this variable leads to a 6.1 percent increase in the domestic turnover of international firms, where 
the average domestic turnover of international firms is about 0.55. After controlling for the 
internationalization dummy and average turnover, however, the other variables add little explanatory 
power. The only exceptions are the size of the stock market (market capitalization/GDP) and to a 
lower extent the Edison and Warnock (2003) liberalization measure.
11, 12  
3.1.2. Migration: Private Placements and Level I ADRs 
As a robustness check, we examine firms that internationalize in a manner that does not 
provide a mechanism for their shares to be easily traded on an international public exchange. Thus, if 
migration is driving the earlier results in Table I, we should not observe a negative coefficient on the 
internationalization dummy when examining this sub-sample of firms, for which migration is less 
likely. More specifically, we examine firms that internationalize (i) through private placements in 
international markets or (ii) by cross-listing on the U.S. over-the-counter (OTC) market through 
Level I ADR programs. Level I ADRs are quoted on the Pink Sheets Electronic Quotation Service 
                                                 
11 To estimate whether the variables of interest explain the high R-squares reported in the table, we ran the regressions 
using only country and year dummies plus assets and compared this R-square with those of the regressions in the table. In 
essence, we compute the partial R-square of the variables on which we are focusing the analysis. This provides a very 
conservative estimate because it overestimates the explanatory power of the country and year dummies. Specifically, none 
of the relation between domestic trading of international firms and the components of the variables of interest that are 
associated with the dummy variables and assets is assigned to the variables of interest. We find that the 
Internationalization Dummy and the average turnover of domestic firms account for about 15 percent of the regression R-
square. Running the regressions only with the variables of interest yields an R-square of 0.38. 
12 We also examined the degree to which the association between the domestic turnover of each international firm and the 
average turnover of domestic firms arises from time-series or cross-sectional relations. We computed the within and 
between R-squares, where the within R-square is the R-square of a regression in deviations from the mean and the 
between R-square is the R-square of a cross-sectional regression using the sample averages of the variables. We estimated 
each of these regressions excluding and including the average turnover of domestic firms, always including the other 
variables in the regression. The results indicate that the average turnover of domestic firms explains more than 10 percent 
of the total within-country variation in the data and about 35 percent of the total between-country variation. Thus, the 
association between the domestic turnover of each international firm and the average turnover of domestic firms arises 
from both time-series and cross-sectional variation in the data.  19 
and/or the OTC Bulletin Board for use by a network of security dealers that make markets in the 
particular securities. This arrangement is much more cumbersome and costly than trading on a major 
public exchange. Similarly, while private placements under rule 144A in the U.S. are traded on the 
electronic PORTAL system among qualified institutions, internationalization in this manner does not 
provide a vehicle for firms to have their shares as widely and inexpensively traded as in a major 
public stock market. For comparison purposes, therefore, we examine this subset of firms for which 
migration will tend to be more difficult than for those that internationalize through cross-listing or 
issuing depositary receipts in a public exchange. As above, in defining the date of 
internationalization, we use the firm’s first internationalization activity. In terms of estimation, we 
use the same specification and econometric techniques as in Equation (1). 
As shown in Table II, internationalization that does not provide a vehicle for trading shares 
abroad on organized exchanges is not associated with a reduction in the turnover of the firm’s shares 
in the local market. That is, the internationalization dummy does not enter negatively. Rather, we find 
that raising capital through private placements abroad or cross-listing on the U.S. OTC market 
through Level I ADRs tends to boost the trading of the firm’s shares in the domestic market. This 
positive effect is significant at the five percent level in regressions 1-5 and at the ten percent level 
when using clustering at the firm level. This positive relation could represent a signaling effect, as 
investors in emerging markets increase their trading of firms that access capital in major financial 
centers. Although we do not identify the reasons underlying the positive relation between 
internationalization and domestic turnover for these firms, this result highlights our early findings on 
migration. When firms from emerging markets internationalize in a way that allows their shares to be 
traded abroad, they tend to experience a drop in trading activity in their own markets.   20 
The Table II regressions suggest that the migration results are not driven by reverse causality, 
whereby firms internationalize to flee from deteriorating domestic markets. As already noted, we 
control for domestic market conditions. Moreover, the Table II regressions show that firms that 
internationalize without providing a mechanism to have their shares traded in public markets abroad 
experience an increase, not a decrease, in domestic trading activity, which runs counter to the fleeing 
argument. Furthermore, Claessens et al. (2005) show that firms from countries with good economic 
and institutional fundamentals are more likely to access and trade in international capital markets, 
which also runs counter to the view that firms from countries with poor local environments are the 
one that internationalize. Thus, these robustness tests and related findings provide further support to 
the migration channel. 
3.1.3. Migration: Additional Evidence and Comments 
We provide additional evidence on the size of the migration effect and on the total trading 
activity of firms that internationalize by examining a subset of firms with detailed trading data in both 
domestic and international markets. Specifically, for firms that internationalize by issuing Level II 
and III American Depositary Receipts, we have data on the trading of their shares in both their local 
market and in New York. For these firms, we assess the degree to which trading actually shifts 
abroad after internationalization and what happens to the total trading of a firm’s shares. We use the 
same basic specification provided in Equation (1), except that the dependent variable in Table III is 
total turnover of international firm j from country c in year t ( )
I
t c j TT , , , defined as the sum of its value 
traded domestically and abroad divided by its market capitalization, and the dependent variable in 
Table IV is the fraction of total turnover of international firm j from country c in year t that takes 
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, , .  21 
Tables III and IV show that (i) the total turnover of a firm soars after it internationalizes and 
(ii) the proportion of total trading that occurs in the local market plummets.
13 Specifically, the 
coefficients in Table III show that the total turnover of international firms increases by around 38 
percent following internationalization.
14 Recall from Table I that the domestic turnover of 
international firms tends to fall after internationalization. Indeed, the estimated coefficients on the 
internationalization dummy in Table IV indicate that one plus the proportion of domestic trading of 
an international firm falls by about 21 percent following internationalization. Since this ratio equals 
two before internationalization (by definition), these estimates imply that the percentage of domestic 
trading of international firms falls to about 58 percent after a firm issues a Level II or III ADR.  
The shift of trading to international market endures. That is, in our sample of emerging market 
firms there is no significant flow-back effect. In particular, we estimated the regressions from Table 
IV using a series of dummy variables that trace out annual patterns following internationalization. We 
found that the share of trading in international markets does not decrease over time. 
These findings are consistent with migration. After controlling for many factors, we find that 
firms that internationalize by allowing their shares to be traded in major financial centers tend to 
experience a drop in the domestic market trading activity of their shares and a rise in total trading 
activity, as trading migrates abroad. Also consistent with migration, firms that internationalize 
without establishing a vehicle to have their shares traded internationally in major public exchanges do 
not experience a drop in their domestic market trading.  
                                                 
13 Eun and Sabherwal (2003) find that the higher the fraction of trading occurring in international financial centers, the 
higher is the contribution of these international markets to price discovery. 
14 Following the same method as above for illustrating the economic magnitudes of these estimated relations, the 
estimated coefficient indicates that one plus the total turnover ratio of firm j from country c in year t rises by about 18 
percent following internationalization. This increase is large given that the average value of the total turnover of 
international firms included in these regressions is about 0.89, which means that for the average firm, total turnover rises 
by 38 percent after it internationalizes.  22 
In these analyses, we focused on trading activity, not liquidity, for two reasons. First, we want 
to assess a possible two-step mechanism linking internationalization with the liquidity of domestic 
firms. The first step involves migration: Does a firm’s domestic trading activity shift out of the 
domestic market and into international financial centers after it internationalizes? Consequently, we 
examine trading, not liquidity. Second, it is conceptually difficult to measure the liquidity of a stock 
that is traded in more than one market. The majority of the trading could occur in New York, for 
example, where the price is established. In this case, there might be no link between trading and 
prices in the local market. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to conclude that the local market is 
more or less liquid based on price-impact liquidity measures. We now turn to a different issue: the 
relation between migration and the liquidity of domestic firms. Does the domestic trading of firms 
that have internationalized influence the liquidity of domestic firms as suggested by the migration-
spillover view? Is there a connection between internationalization and domestic market liquidity 
beyond the migration-spillover effect? In particular, is the location of trading activity of international 
firms associated with the liquidity of domestic firms? 
3.2 SPILLOVERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
This section evaluates whether the aggregate trading of international firms in the domestic 
market and the share of trading activity taking place abroad affect the trading activity and liquidity of 
individual domestic firms. To conduct this test, we begin by examining whether the trading activity 
of a domestic equity varies with the aggregate domestic trading activity of international firms. Then, 
we use two specific measures of liquidity to assess whether the liquidity of a domestic equity varies 
with the aggregate domestic trading activity of international firms. Finding that trading activity and 
liquidity of individual domestic firms are positively associated with the aggregate trading activity of 
international firms in the local market after controlling for firm, country, and time-specific factors  23 
would constitute evidence of spillovers. We also analyze whether the share of a country’s total 
trading taking place abroad affects the turnover and liquidity of individual domestic firms. Finding a 
negative relation between the share of trading occurring in international markets and the liquidity of 
domestic equities, would show that internationalization has a negative impact on domestic markets 
beyond the migration-spillover channel. 
3.2.1. Spillovers and the International Market: Trading Activity 
In Table V, we assess whether the turnover ratio of domestic firm j from country c in year t 
( )
D
t c j T , ,  is related to the average domestic turnover of public international firms from country c in year 
t ( )
I
t c T , . In testing for spillovers, we only examine the domestic trading activity of international firms 
that are traded in public markets abroad, as the evidence presented above shows that the domestic 
turnover of these firms tends to fall following internationalization. Thus, 
I
t c T ,  does not include the 
domestic trading activity of firms that internationalized through private placements or through the 
OTC market.
15 The following specification is estimated: 




t c t c j
D
t c j n C ST T A T , 2 1 , , , , , , , ε τ δ δ θ γ β φ + × + × + × + × + × + × = .     (2) 
As in the migration regressions, we estimate Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms, and also report firm-level clustered standard 
errors. We include country and year dummy variables as well. Furthermore, we incorporate the same 
time-varying firm and country characteristics discussed and defined in the subsection on migration. 
By conditioning on these variables, the goal is to identify the independent relation between the 
trading of international firms in the local market and the trading activity (and later liquidity) of 
individual domestic firms. 
                                                 
15 The results hold when using the domestic turnover of all international firms. This supports the basic principle of 
spillovers: The aggregate activity of a market influences the liquidity of individual shares.  24 
The results are consistent with large spillovers. The coefficient on 
I
t c T ,  enters positively and 
significantly at the one percent level in all of the specifications in Table V. The spillover effects are 
economically relevant. The size of the coefficient in regression 5 of Table V implies that the average 
domestic firm will experience a five percent reduction in its turnover when the average domestic 
turnover of international firms falls by 12 percent.
16 Thus, the estimated coefficients suggest an 
economically large relation between the trading of an individual domestic firm and the aggregate 
trading of international firms on the local market. 
We find these spillover effects when controlling for many country and firms characteristics. 
In particular, after conditioning on country and year dummy variables, the size of the domestic firm, 
the level of economic development, the size of the local stock market, and indicators of stock market 
liberalization, we find evidence consistent with spillovers. Furthermore, the estimated size of the 
spillover effect does not vary much when using various combinations of these control variables.  
The fraction of trading that occurs in international financial centers enters negatively and 
significantly. Even when controlling for many country traits and while controlling for the domestic 
trading of international firms, we find that the fraction of trading activity that occurs abroad is 
negatively associated with the domestic trading activity of domestic firms. While it is impossible to 
pin one interpretation to the coefficient on this variable, the results suggest that something beyond the 
migration and spillover channel links internationalization and domestic markets. For example, the 
results indicate that as New York becomes a more important trading place for Mexican stocks 
(relative to the total trading of Mexican stocks), the turnover of domestic Mexican stocks declines. 
                                                 
16 The coefficient shows that a five percent increase in one plus the average domestic turnover of international firms leads 
to an increase of three percent in one plus the turnover of domestic firms. Given that the average domestic turnover of 
international firms (in this regression) is 0.68 and the average turnover of domestic firms is 1.35, these implies that that 
the average domestic firm’s stock will experience a five percent reduction in its turnover when the average domestic 
turnover of international firms falls by 12 percent.  25 
Thus, according to this measure, internationalization is associated with a drop in the trading of 
domestic firms, even after controlling for local market conditions.  
Finally, note that the logarithm of total assets enters negatively in these regressions. This is 
because assets are very highly correlated with market capitalization, and the dependent variable 
(turnover) has market capitalization in its denominator. In the tables below where we examine 
specific measures of illiquidity, we find a negative relation between firm size and illiquidity. 
3.2.2. Spillovers and the International Market: Amihud Illiquidity Index 
Next, we examine the impact of internationalization on the liquidity of domestic equities, 
using daily data to compute Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity index. Liquidity is a complex concept that is 
not observed directly. While many authors use turnover as a proxy for liquidity, turnover does not 
directly measure trading costs or the price impact of transactions. Bid-ask spread measures of trading 
costs do not exist for the bulk of our sample, so we compute a price-impact measure. Since 
Hasbrouck (2005) finds that, within the class of price-impact liquidity estimates, Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity index is the most reliable proxy of trading costs, we start with this measure. 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity index is defined as the average ratio of absolute return to trading 
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Where  t c j I , ,  is the illiquidity ratio of firm j from country c in year t,  t d c j P , , , ∆  is the percent change in 
the stock price of firm j from country c on day d of year t,  t d c j V , , ,  is the value traded of firms’ j stock 
from country c on day d of year t, and  t c j D , ,  is the number of days for which the ratio can be 
calculated for firm j from country c in year t. The index is multiplied by 10
6 so the results are easier  26 
to read. This index relates the absolute value of price movement to the value of equity transactions. 
This measure follows Kyle’s (1985) concept of liquidity, the response of price to order flow.  
We compute this illiquidity index using daily data on share prices in dollars, so that it can be 
interpreted as the percent price response to one dollar worth of trading, allowing for comparison 
across countries. As an alternative, we also followed the methodology used by Lesmond (2005), 
estimating the illiquidity index using daily prices in local currency and then converting the annual 
index into dollars using the average exchange rate over the year to allow for a comparison across 
countries. We obtained very similar results to those reported below. We use the same specification as 
in Equation (2), except now the dependent variable is Amihud’s illiquidity index ( )
D
t c j I , , . In our 
sample, this illiquidity measure is correlated with turnover. For domestic firms, the simple correlation 
coefficient is -0.33 (significant at the one percent level), that is, as turnover increases illiquidity 
decreases. 
The results presented in Table VI provide additional evidence for liquidity spillovers. Average 
turnover of public international firms in the domestic market (measured in logarithms) enters 
negatively and significantly at the one percent level in all of the illiquidity regressions. This suggests 
that less domestic trading of international firms is associated with a drop in the liquidity (higher 
Amihud illiquidity index) of domestic firm shares. Again, these results hold when conditioning on a 
wide assortment of information. Furthermore, the spillover effects from the domestic trading of 
international firms to the liquidity of domestic stocks are relevant, though not enormous. The size of 
the coefficient in regression 5 of Table VI suggests that the illiquidity index of the typically domestic 
firm will jump by about two percent when the domestic turnover of international firms falls by 10  27 
percent.
17 Since internationalization is associated with a drop in the domestic turnover of the average 
internationalizing firm of about 17 percent (Table I), these estimates suggest a non-negligible link 
between internationalization and the liquidity of domestic firms. 
We also find that the illiquidity of a domestic stock is positively associated with the share of 
trading occurring in international markets. This holds even when controlling for local market 
conditions, including the domestic trading of international firms. Thus, while the results in Table VI 
support the hypothesis of spillovers, the results also indicate that as trading abroad increases in 
relative terms, the liquidity of domestic firms falls. This effect is independent of spillover effects. 
3.2.3. Spillovers and the International Market: Zero Return Illiquidity Measures 
We finally consider an additional measure of the illiquidity of domestic stocks. 
D
t c j ZR , , equals 
the fraction of trading days in a year t when a firm’s stock (firm j from country c) experienced zero 
returns. As mentioned in the Introduction, the literature has recently used illiquidity measures based 
on the proportion of zero-return days. Lesmond et al. (1999) argue that if the value of information is 
insufficient to outweigh the costs associated with transacting, then market participants will choose 
not to trade, resulting in an observed zero return. Therefore, the proportion of zero returns is 
associated with transaction costs. In our data, the proportion of zero-return days is positively 
correlated with the Amihud measure and negatively correlated with turnover, with the correlations 
being 0.42 and -0.33, respectively, and in both cases significant at the one percent level. Although 
there is greater theoretical appeal to using price-impact liquidity measures, such as the Amihud ratio 
employed above, we use this additional measure of liquidity as a robustness check. We also created 
an additional indicator of liquidity, equal to the fraction of trading days in year t when a firm’s stock 
                                                 
17 Following the illustrative examples above, the regression estimates suggest that a five percent decrease in one plus the 
average domestic turnover of international firms is associated with an increase of one percent in one plus the Amihud 
illiquidity ratio of domestic firms. Given that the average domestic turnover of international firms for the sample included 
in this specification is 0.71 and the average illiquidity index for domestic firms is 0.81, this means that the illiquidity of 
domestic firms tends to rise by two percent when there is a 12 percent decrease in domestic trading of international firms.  28 
(firm j from country c) experienced zero trading, that is zero returns and no trading activity. Holding 
other things constant, more days with no trading suggests less liquidity. When we use this as the 
dependent variable, we find very similar results. We compute this measure using daily price data in 
domestic currency, as returns calculated using data in foreign currency may be affected by exchange 
rate volatility. 
The results in Table VII are consistent with spillovers. The domestic trading of international 
firms is negatively associated with illiquidity. In particular, there is a negative and significant (at the 
one percent level) relation between the proportion of days with zero returns and the logarithm of one 
plus the average turnover of public international firms in the domestic market. Thus, a reduction in 
the domestic trading of international firms is associated with an increase in the number days that 
domestic firms experience zero returns. Moreover, confirming previous results, when trading abroad 
as a share of total trading increases, the proportion of zero return days by domestic firms increases, 
i.e. domestic firms become more illiquid.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we find evidence that supports the view that internationalization has a negative 
impact on domestic stock market liquidity. First, the evidence is broadly consistent with the two-part 
migration-spillover view of internationalization. When a firm cross-lists or issues depositary receipts 
in an international public exchange (e.g., the NYSE), we find that the trading of the firm’s shares 
tends to migrate out of the domestic market and into the international market. Furthermore, there is 
strong evidence of spillovers in stock markets. The liquidity of individual domestic firms is positively 
associated with the aggregate domestic trading activity of international firms even when controlling 
for domestic market conditions, country characteristics, and firm traits. Thus, there is some evidence  29 
for policymakers concerns that firms that cross-list or issue depositary receipts in major public 
exchanges facilitate the migration of trading out of the domestic market, which hurts the liquidity of 
domestic firms.  
Second, we find that migration and spillovers are not the only links between 
internationalization and the liquidity of domestic firms. In particular, the aggregate share of trading 
abroad is negatively associated with the liquidity of domestic firms. Thus, even when controlling for 
the migration-spillover channel and domestic market conditions, a domestic firm’s liquidity is 
negatively linked with the proportion of trading from the same country that takes place aboard. The 
findings are consistent with arguments that investors seeking to hold country-specific risk shift their 
trading of a country’s stocks to lower cost, lower risk international markets when firms from that 
country internationalize. This reduces their trading of domestic firms in the local market, with 
negative repercussions on the liquidity of these firms. The findings are also consistent with arguments 
that internationalization signals that a firm is of comparatively high quality, which might then have 
adverse implications on the liquidity of domestic firms. Thus, substantially more research is needed 
into decomposing the relation between internationalization and the drop in domestic firm liquidity. 
The estimated effects suggest that internationalization is associated with important 
distributional effects. Firms that internationalize experience a substantial increase in the total 
(domestic plus international) trading of their shares. However, the migration of their trading out of 
the domestic market and into international markets is tied to a substantive drop in the liquidity of 
domestic firms. Thus, internationalization is associated with large distributional changes to liquidity 
across firms. These effects are relevant because, as shown by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), firm 
liquidity influences the cost of capital. It would be valuable for future research to explore more fully 
the country, industry, and firm characteristics that drive corporate internationalization decisions and  30 
to investigate whether domestic firms receive countervailing benefits from the internationalization 
process.  
The liquidity spillovers in markets around the world documented in this paper are important 
by themselves, even beyond the migration of trading out of local markets. These spillover effects 
suggest that there is a powerful force for the consolidation of trading within a few markets. This 
consolidation may occur both within a country and across international markets. This paper has 
shown that for international firms from emerging economies the relevant market might exist outside 
the borders of their home markets. On the other hand, Halling et al. (2005) find that for European 
cross-listed firms the relevant market is within their home country. These differences suggest that 
markets of different sizes and quality may have different “gravitational pulls” on the trading activity 
of cross-listed firms. More research is needed to understand the determinants and implications of 
these different equilibria.   31 
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 Log of Total Assetsj,c,t -0.012 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.010]
Internationalization Dummyj,c,t -0.053 ** -0.051 ** -0.056 ** -0.056 ** -0.061 ** -0.061 *
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.033]
Log (1+ Average Turnover of Domestic Firms)c,t 0.423 *** 0.440 *** 0.432 *** 0.388 *** 0.434 *** 0.434 ***
[0.050] [0.051] [0.056] [0.053] [0.054] [0.055]
Stock Market Liberalization Dummyc,t 0.006 0.005 -0.006 -0.006
[0.035] [0.036] [0.037] [0.034]
Log of (1+Value Traded Abroad/Total Value Traded)c,t 0.026 -0.058 0.011 0.011
[0.097] [0.108] [0.098] [0.097]
Stock Market Liberalization  0.113 *
   Edison and Warnock (2003) Measurec,t [0.065]
Log of GDP per capitac,t 0.008 0.008
[0.054] [0.062]
Market Capitalization / GDPc,t 0.125 *** 0.125 ***
[0.040] [0.037]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,516 1,419 1,390 1,385 1,390 1,390
Number of Firms 264 236 235 231 235 235
Number of Countries 36 32 32 25 32 32
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.48
Log (1+Domestic Turnover)
Domestic Trading Activity of International Firms: Publicly Listed Firms
Table I
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio in domestic markets of firms that internationalize by allowing their shares to be traded on a major
international exchange. The internationalization date represents the date of their first international activity. The internationalization dummy( ID j,c,t) equals one on and after the year
when a firm becomes international and zero otherwise (it becomes zero if a firm is delisted). The regressions include country and year dummies, though they are not reported in the
table. Standard errors are in brackets. Columns (1) to (5) report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Column (6)
reports standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. The estimated equation is the following:
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




t c t c j t c j
I
t c j n C ST T ID A T , 2 1 , , , , , , , , , ε τ δ δ θ γ β α φ + × + × + × + × + × + × + × =Log of Total Assetsj,c,t -0.014 * -0.017 ** -0.018 ** -0.015 ** -0.020 ** -0.020
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.013]
Internationalization Dummyj,c,t 0.077 *** 0.082 *** 0.067 *** 0.067 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *
[0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.032]
Log (1+ Average Turnover of Domestic Firms)c,t 0.543 *** 0.560 *** 0.508 *** 0.470 *** 0.529 *** 0.529 ***
[0.049] [0.052] [0.050] [0.049] [0.048] [0.049]
Stock Market Liberalization Dummyc,t 0.012 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007
[0.027] [0.028] [0.029] [0.036]
Log of (1+Value Traded Abroad/Total Value Traded)c,t -0.219 ** -0.290 *** -0.223 ** -0.223 *
[0.098] [0.093] [0.099] [0.113]
Stock Market Liberalization  0.189 ***
   Edison and Warnock (2003) Measurec,t [0.057]
Log of GDP per capitac,t 0.058 0.058
[0.056] [0.054]
Market Capitalization / GDPc,t 0.128 *** 0.128 ***
[0.032] [0.026]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,720 1,554 1,525 1,622 1,525 1,525
Number of Firms 293 248 247 274 247 247
Number of Countries 37 32 32 28 32 32
R-squared 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.54
Log (1+Domestic Turnover)
Domestic Trading Activity of International Firms: Private Placements and Level I ADRs
Table II
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio in domestic markets of firms that internationalize through private placements in international financial centers
or by cross-listing on the U.S. over-the-counter (OTC) market through Level I ADR programs. The internationalization date represents the date of their first international activity.
The internationalization dummy (ID j,c,t) equals one on and after the year when a firm becomes international and zero otherwise (it becomes zero if a firm is delisted). Firms are
excluded from the regressions if and when they become publicly traded in international equity markets. The regressions include country and year dummies, though they are not
reported in the table. Standard errors are in brackets. Columns (1) to (5) report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms.
Column (6) reports standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. The estimated equation is the
following:
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




t c t c j t c j
I
t c j n C ST T ID A T , 2 1 , , , , , , , , , ε τ δ δ θ γ β α φ + × + × + × + × + × + × + × =Log of Total Assetsj,c,t -0.046 *** -0.039 ** -0.030 ** -0.039 *** -0.026 ** -0.026
[0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.016]
Internationalization Dummyj,c,t 0.196 *** 0.191 *** 0.164 *** 0.169 *** 0.164 *** 0.164 ***
[0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.040] [0.044]
Log (1+ Average Turnover of Domestic Firms)c,t 0.395 *** 0.410 *** 0.383 *** 0.361 *** 0.387 *** 0.387 ***
[0.084] [0.088] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.058]
Stock Market Liberalization Dummyc,t -0.010 -0.017 -0.002 -0.002
[0.047] [0.049] [0.048] [0.046]
Log of (1+Value Traded Abroad/Total Value Traded)c,t 0.361 *** 0.327 ** 0.404 *** 0.404 ***
[0.129] [0.142] [0.132] [0.136]
Stock Market Liberalization  0.025
   Edison and Warnock (2003) Measurec,t [0.101]
Log of GDP per capitac,t -0.220 *** -0.220 ***
[0.081] [0.069]
Market Capitalization / GDPc,t -0.044 -0.044
[0.076] [0.077]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 696 655 645 658 645 645
Number of Firms 119 106 105 110 105 105
Number of Countries 20 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.51
Log (1+Total Turnover)
Total Trading Activity of International Firms: Firms with Level II and III ADRs
Table III
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the total turnover ratio of international companies of firms with Level II and III ADR programs, which trade on a major U.S.
exchange (Amex, NASDAQ, or NYSE). The internationalization dummy (ID j,c,t) equals one on and after the year when a firm starts trading in these markets and zero otherwise (it
becomes zero if a firm is delisted). The regressions include country and year dummies, though they are not reported in the table. Standard errors are in brackets. Columns (1) to (5)
report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Column (6) reports standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-
level.  *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. The estimated equation is the following:
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




t c t c j t c j
I
t c j n C ST T ID A TT , 2 1 , , , , , , , , , ε τ δ δ θ γ β α φ + × + × + × + × + × + × + × =Log of Total Assetsj,c,t 0.013 ** 0.016 *** 0.017 *** 0.013 ** 0.014 ** 0.014
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011]
Internationalization Dummyj,c,t -0.227 *** -0.223 *** -0.206 *** -0.208 *** -0.214 *** -0.214 ***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.029]
Log (1+ Average Turnover of Domestic Firms)c,t 0.077 *** 0.088 *** 0.058 ** 0.042 0.050 * 0.050 *
[0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.024]
Stock Market Liberalization Dummyc,t -0.043 -0.037 -0.050 ** -0.050 *
[0.027] [0.023] [0.024] [0.028]
Log of (1+Value Traded Abroad/Total Value Traded)c,t -0.341 *** -0.373 *** -0.377 *** -0.377 ***
[0.081] [0.081] [0.078] [0.101]
Stock Market Liberalization  0.046
   Edison and Warnock (2003) Measurec,t [0.038]
Log of GDP per capitac,t 0.101 ** 0.101 **
[0.044] [0.043]
Market Capitalization / GDPc,t 0.114 *** 0.114 ***
[0.032] [0.028]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 705 663 653 660 653 653
Number of Firms 120 107 106 110 106 106
Number of Countries 20 18 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57
Log (1+Turnover in Domestic Market / Total Turnover)
Migration: Firms with Level II and III ADRs
Table IV
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the ratio of turnover in domestic markets over the total turnover of firms with Level II and III ADR programs, which trade on a
major U.S. exchange (Amex, NASDAQ, or NYSE). The internationalization dummy (ID j,c,t) equals one on and after the year when a firm starts trading in these markets and zero
otherwise (it becomes zero if a firm is delisted). The regressions include country and year dummies, though they are not reported in the table. Standard errors are in brackets.
Columns (1) to (5) report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Column (6) reports standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the firm-level.  *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. The estimated equation is the following:
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




t c t c j t c j
I
t c j n C ST T ID A ST , 2 1 , , , , , , , , , ε τ δ δ θ γ β α φ + × + × + × + × + × + × + × =Log of Total Assetsj,c,t -0.074 *** -0.072 *** -0.072 *** -0.077 *** -0.072 *** -0.072 ***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007]
Log ( 1+ Average Turnover of Public International  0.500 *** 0.580 *** 0.567 *** 0.438 *** 0.596 *** 0.596 ***
   Firms in the Domestic Market)c,t [0.033] [0.035] [0.038] [0.039] [0.038] [0.038]
Stock Market Liberalization Dummyc,t -0.022 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
[0.027] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026]
Log of (1+Value Traded Abroad/Total Value Traded)c,t -0.466 *** -0.526 *** -0.497 *** -0.497 ***
[0.063] [0.066] [0.065] [0.068]
Stock Market Liberalization  0.159 ***
   Edison and Warnock (2003) Measurec,t [0.030]
Log of GDP per capitac,t 0.319 *** 0.319 ***
[0.045] [0.043]
Market Capitalization / GDPc,t -0.108 *** -0.108 ***
[0.019] [0.019]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6,480 6,157 5,971 5,938 5,971 5,971
Number of Firms 1,318 1,213 1,195 1,167 1,195 1,195
Number of Countries 36 32 32 25 32 32
R-squared 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.53
Log (1+Domestic Turnover)
Trading Activity of Domestic Firms
Table V
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the turnover ratio of domestic companies. The regressor T
I
c,t equals the logarithm of one plus the average domestic turnover of
international firms that are traded in major public exchanges abroad. The regressions include country and year dummies, though they are not reported in the table. Standard errors
are in brackets. Columns (1) to (5) report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Column (6) reports standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. The estimated equation is the following:
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




t c t c j
D
t c j n C ST T A T , 2 1 , , , , , , , ε τ δ δ θ γ β φ + × + × + × + × + × + × =Log of Total Assetsj,c,t -0.097 *** -0.096 *** -0.098 *** -0.100 *** -0.095 *** -0.095 ***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007]
Log ( 1+ Average Turnover of Public International  -0.179 *** -0.220 *** -0.267 *** -0.168 *** -0.180 *** -0.180 ***
   Firms in the Domestic Market)c,t [0.023] [0.024] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033]
Stock Market Liberalization Dummyc,t 0.046 0.031 -0.066 -0.066
[0.040] [0.041] [0.042] [0.051]
Log of (1+Value Traded Abroad/Total Value Traded)c,t 0.282 ** 0.410 *** 0.440 *** 0.440 ***
[0.116] [0.117] [0.117] [0.149]
Stock Market Liberalization  -0.190 ***
   Edison and Warnock (2003) Measurec,t [0.029]
Log of GDP per capitac,t -0.184 *** -0.184 ***
[0.053] [0.059]
Market Capitalization / GDPc,t -0.179 *** -0.179 ***
[0.014] [0.017]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 5,879 5,573 5,373 5,510 5,373 5,373
Number of Firms 989 915 909 910 909 909
Number of Countries 31 29 29 24 29 29
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.42
Log (1+Amihud Illiquidity Ratio)
Liquidity of Domestic Firms: Amihud Illiquidity Ratio
Table VI
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the Amihud illiquidity ratio of domestic companies. The regressor T
I
c,t equals the logarithm of one plus the average domestic
turnover of international firms that are traded in major public exchanges abroad. The regressions include country and year dummies, though they are not reported in the table.
Standard errors are in brackets. Columns (1) to (5) report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Column (6) reports
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-level.  *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. The estimated equation is the following:
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




t c t c j
D
t c j n C ST T A I , 2 1 , , , , , , , ε τ δ δ θ γ β φ + × + × + × + × + × + × =Log of Total Assetsj,c,t -0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.021 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 ***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Log ( 1+ Average Turnover of Public International  -0.043 *** -0.049 *** -0.066 *** -0.063 *** -0.047 *** -0.047 ***
   Firms in the Domestic Market)c,t [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
Stock Market Liberalization Dummyc,t 0.006 -0.006 -0.025 ** -0.025
[0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.016]
Log of (1+Value Traded Abroad/Total Value Traded)c,t 0.277 *** 0.285 *** 0.303 *** 0.303 ***
[0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.048]
Stock Market Liberalization  0.011
   Edison and Warnock (2003) Measurec,t [0.008]
Log of GDP per capitac,t 0.000 0.000
[0.015] [0.016]
Market Capitalization / GDPc,t -0.045 *** -0.045 ***
[0.004] [0.004]
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6,380 6,067 5,863 5,999 5,863 5,863
Number of Firms 1,025 950 944 946 944 944
Number of Countries 31 29 29 24 29 29
R-squared 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.52
Log (1+Proportion of Zero Return Days)
Liquidity of Domestic Firms: Proportion of Zero Return Days
Table VII
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the proportion of zero return days of domestic companies. The regressor T
I
c,t equals the logarithm of one plus the average
domestic turnover of international firms that are traded in major public exchanges abroad. The regressions include country and year dummies, though they are not reported in the
table. Standard errors are in brackets. Columns (1) to (5) report Newey-West standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Column (6)
reports standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-level.  *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. The estimated equation is the following:
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




t c t c j
D
t c j n C ST T A ZR , 2 1 , , , , , , , ε τ δ δ θ γ β φ + × + × + × + × + × + × =1 Argentina 8 9 18 9 22 10 1990-2000 0.40 0.29 1.67 1.57 0.48 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.44 0.40 0.45 0.31
2 Bahrain 1 14 1 12 1 14 1999-2000 0.11 0.13 .... 0 . 0 5 .....
3 Brazil 49 47 29 52 52 52 1989-2000 0.33 0.39 0.61 1.30 0.40 0.27 0.41 0.38 0.78 0.30 0.47 0.45
4 Bulgaria 1 0 0 16 1 16 1998-2000 ...... 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 ....
5 Chile 21 33 22 36 24 36 1989-2000 0.09 0.10 1.12 0.88 0.50 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.45 0.32 0.42 0.31
6 China 50 78 27 200 54 200 1992-2000 1.59 1.97 0.75 0.80 0.41 0.26 1.40 1.47 0.74 0.23 2.15 1.38
7 Colombia 7 21 3 28 7 28 1989-2000 0.10 0.08 1.31 1.00 0.63 0.24 0.12 0.08 ....
8 C r o a t i a 251727 1997-2000 0.04 0.05 .... 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 4 ....
9 Czech Republic 5 45 3 71 5 71 1995-2000 0.21 0.49 3.08 2.60 0.37 0.21 0.40 0.42 ....
10 Egypt 6 14 7 72 7 72 1997-2000 0.30 0.41 1.18 1.30 0.20 0.15 0.41 0.29 ....
11 Estonia 2 8 1 11 2 11 1997-2000 0.26 0.29 2.55 2.10 0.47 0.25 0.30 0.47 ....
12 Ghana 1 10 1 10 1 10 1996-2000 0.09 0.12 .... 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 9 0 . 1 8
13 Greece 8 67 9 77 11 77 1989-2000 0.60 0.55 1.02 1.71 0.23 0.20 0.41 0.39 0.98 0.05 0.35 0.25
14 Hungary 15 8 9 10 15 10 1992-2000 0.65 0.50 1.21 1.63 0.28 0.26 0.86 1.20 0.75 0.16 0.47 0.33
15 India 49 108 28 130 52 130 1990-2000 0.34 1.02 2.07 2.11 0.23 0.15 0.62 1.10 0.90 0.15 1.14 1.83
16 Indonesia 8 97 5 129 10 129 1990-2000 0.96 1.67 1.00 1.30 0.55 0.22 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.19 0.68 0.25
17 Israel 18 28 17 34 20 34 1997-2000 0.26 0.14 0.27 0.33 0.15 0.06 0.45 0.33 0.58 0.33 0.74 0.46
18 Jamaica 2 0 0 17 2 17 1999-2000 ...... 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 6 ....
19 Jordan 3 4 1 41 3 41 1997-2000 0.13 0.08 .... 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 5 ....
20 Korea 32 176 18 195 33 196 1989-2000 3.87 6.75 0.24 0.59 0.17 0.06 2.25 4.22 0.88 0.15 1.57 3.85
21 Latvia 2 12 2 14 2 14 1997-2000 0.45 0.71 4.12 1.23 0.47 0.19 0.40 0.40 ....
2 2 L e b a n o n 200323 1999-2000 ...... 0 . 0 8 0 . 1 1 ....
23 Lithuania 4 8 1 40 4 40 1996-2000 0.11 0.18 3.64 2.06 0.66 0.21 0.23 0.26 ....
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Appendix Table I
Basic Statistics and Means
Country
This table reports summary statistics by country. It displays the total number of firms, the number of international firms, the number of domestic firms, the sample coverage, and the sample average of the trading and liquidity variables used in the regressions.
International companies are the ones that issue a depositary receipt, cross-list, or raise capital in international equity markets.
Sample Period
Mean












No. of Firms in the 
Aggregate Measures
Proportion of Zero 
Return Days
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Int'l. 
Firms24 Malaysia 13 174 3 183 13 188 1989-2000 1.29 4.24 0.57 0.85 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.41 ....
25 Mexico 51 13 41 38 61 38 1989-2000 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.48 0.27 0.18 0.46 0.38 0.52 0.33 1.17 0.91
26 Morocco 1 11 1 20 1 20 1997-2000 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.33 0.11 0.21 0.11 ....
27 Nigeria 1 0 0 27 1 27 1999-2000 ...... 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 3 ....
28 Pakistan 4 0 0 56 4 56 1997-2000 ...... 3 . 3 2 3 . 1 7 ....
29 Peru 8 22 5 34 8 34 1992-2000 0.75 0.70 1.33 1.10 0.51 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.60 0.30 0.49 0.35
30 Philippines 15 58 6 63 16 63 1989-2000 0.71 1.06 1.41 1.52 0.46 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.69 0.30 0.62 0.45
31 Poland 17 23 8 27 18 27 1992-2000 0.78 0.75 1.21 1.21 0.27 0.21 0.77 0.88 ....
32 Portugal 8 28 3 39 8 39 1989-1998 0.27 0.21 1.19 1.26 0.43 0.20 0.61 0.52 0.84 0.16 0.53 0.43
33 Romania 1 12 1 32 1 34 1999-2000 0.24 0.18 1.26 1.43 0.75 0.21 0.05 .....
34 Russia 14 11 5 23 16 23 1996-2000 0.28 0.37 1.67 1.49 0.69 0.26 0.33 0.48 0.63 0.30 0.88 0.84
35 Slovak Republic 2 0 0 18 2 18 1997-2000 ...... 0 . 2 1 0 . 2 7 ....
36 Slovenia 2 14 2 15 2 16 1996-2000 0.34 0.30 0.52 0.87 0.14 0.10 0.39 0.22 ....
37 South Africa 46 37 25 41 48 41 1992-2000 0.22 0.32 0.44 0.65 0.37 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.91 0.24 0.46 0.35
38 Sri Lanka 1 0 0 65 1 65 1994-2000 ...... 0 . 2 4 0 . 0 8 ....
39 Taiwan 29 115 13 113 29 118 1989-2000 3.85 3.69 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.04 3.15 3.36 0.96 0.08 4.06 3.13
40 Thailand 13 0 0 112 13 112 1989-2000 ...... 0 . 6 5 0 . 8 7 ....
41 Tunisia 1 11 1 17 1 17 1996-2000 0.09 0.08 .... 0 . 1 5 0 . 0 7 ....
42 Turkey 13 55 6 64 14 64 1990-2000 2.09 3.21 0.30 0.52 0.42 0.26 1.98 4.10 0.64 . 0.38 .
43 Ukraine 4 0 0 14 4 14 1997-2000 ...... 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 4 ....
44 Venezuela 13 7 4 10 13 10 1989-2000 0.13 0.10 0.78 0.64 0.52 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.49 0.39 0.63 0.71
45 Zimbabwe 4 8 3 21 4 23 1993-2000 0.13 0.12 1.21 0.78 0.56 0.14 0.22 0.18 ....
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No. of Firms in the 
Aggregate Measures
Appendix Table I (Continued)
Basic Statistics and Means
Country
This table reports summary statistics by country. It displays the total number of firms, the number of international firms, the number of domestic firms, the sample coverage, and the sample average of the trading and liquidity variables used in the regressions.













Proportion of Zero 
Return DaysSeries Description Source
Variables related to the 
internationalization of stock 
markets
Dates of cross-listings, depositary receipts issuances, and capital raisings in international equity
markets. This information is used to classify firms as domestic or international and date the start of
their international activities. International companies are the ones that issue a depositary receipt, cross-
list, or raise capital in international equity markets. Different variables are constructed using these
data. See text for details.
Bank of New York, Citigroup, Euromoney, JP Morgan, the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and NASDAQ.  
Domestic market capitalization Market capitalization in domestic stock markets. End-of-year data in current U.S. dollars.  Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Database (formerly collected by the 
International Finance Corporation, IFC) 
Domestic value traded Value traded in domestic stock markets. Annual data in current U.S. dollars. Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Database (formerly collected by the 
International Finance Corporation, IFC) 
Value traded abroad Value traded in American Depositary Receipts covering the period 1989-2000. The series are
computed at the firm level by adding the different depositary receipts that belong to each company on
a yearly basis. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
Bank of New York
GDP per capita at market prices Gross domestic product (GDP) in current U.S. dollars divided by mid-year population. The GDP (at
purchaser prices data) is converted from domestic currencies using official exchange rates. For the
cases in which the official exchange rate is different from the market rate, the latter is used.
World Bank: World Development Indicators
Stock market liberalization 
dummy
Dummy that equals one on and after the year of stock market liberalization. The liberalization date
corresponds to the date of formal regulatory change after which foreign investors officially have the
possibility to invest in domestic equity securities. For the data from Vinhas de Souza (2005), we
consider the first year when a country's stock market is fully liberalized as the liberalization date.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundbald (2005) and Vinhas de Souza (2005)
Stock Market Liberalization 
Edison and Warnock (2003) 
Measure
Stock market liberalization measure based on S&P/IFC Indexes. The variable used is the smoothed
measure calculated by Edison and Warnock (2003), which takes into account asymmetric shocks to
investable and non-investable stocks. We converted their capital control index into a liberalization
measure by subtracting one from it.
Edison and Warnock (2003)
Total assets Total assets as reported in Worldscope for each firm-year, in millions of U.S. dollars. The sample
covers the period 1989-2000 for all countries.
Worldscope
Daily stock price Daily stock price in domestic markets (main stock exchange). Data in current U.S. dollars are used to
calculated the Amihud illiquidity ratio, so the data are comparable across countries. Similar results are
obtained when calculating the Amihud illiquidity ratio using data in local currency. Data in local
currency are used to calculate the proportion of zero-return days.
Datastream




Series Description and Data Sources
This table shows the description of the data used and their coverage and sources.